Monitoring and Access Policies for HTTP Egress Traffic

By Vadim Eisenberg and Ronen Schaffer (IBM) |  June 22, 2018 (updated on March 4, 2019) |  15 minute read

While Istio’s main focus is management of traffic between microservices inside a service mesh, Istio can also manage ingress (from outside into the mesh) and egress (from the mesh outwards) traffic. Istio can uniformly enforce access policies and aggregate telemetry data for mesh-internal, ingress and egress traffic.

In this blog post, we show how to apply monitoring and access policies to HTTP egress traffic with Istio.

Use case

Consider an organization that runs applications that process content from cnn.com. The applications are decomposed into microservices deployed in an Istio service mesh. The applications access pages of various topics from cnn.com: edition.cnn.com/politics, edition.cnn.com/sport and edition.cnn.com/health. The organization configures Istio to allow access to edition.cnn.com and everything works fine. However, at some point in time, the organization decides to banish politics. Practically, it means blocking access to edition.cnn.com/politics and allowing access to edition.cnn.com/sport and edition.cnn.com/health only. The organization will grant permissions to individual applications and to particular users to access edition.cnn.com/politics, on a case-by-case basis.

To achieve that goal, the organization’s operations people monitor access to the external services and analyze Istio logs to verify that no unauthorized request was sent to edition.cnn.com/politics. They also configure Istio to prevent access to edition.cnn.com/politics automatically.

The organization is resolved to prevent any tampering with the new policy. It decides to put mechanisms in place that will prevent any possibility for a malicious application to access the forbidden topic.

As opposed to the telemetry and security tasks above, this blog post describes Istio’s monitoring and access policies applied exclusively to the egress traffic.

Before you begin

Follow the steps in the Egress Gateway with TLS Origination example, with mutual TLS authentication enabled, without the Cleanup step. After completing that example, you can access edition.cnn.com/politics from an in-mesh container with curl installed. This blog post assumes that the SOURCE_POD environment variable contains the source pod’s name and that the container’s name is sleep.

Configure monitoring and access policies

Since you want to accomplish your tasks in a secure way, you should direct egress traffic through egress gateway, as described in the Egress Gateway with TLS Origination task. The secure way here means that you want to prevent malicious applications from bypassing Istio monitoring and policy enforcement.

According to our scenario, the organization performed the instructions in the Before you begin section, enabled HTTP traffic to edition.cnn.com, and configured that traffic to pass through the egress gateway. The egress gateway performs TLS origination to edition.cnn.com, so the traffic leaves the mesh encrypted. At this point, the organization is ready to configure Istio to monitor and apply access policies for the traffic to edition.cnn.com.

Logging

Configure Istio to log access to *.cnn.com. You create a logentry and two stdio handlers, one for logging forbidden access (error log level) and another one for logging all access to *.cnn.com (info log level). Then you create rules to direct your logentry instances to your handlers. One rule directs access to *.cnn.com/politics to the handler for logging forbidden access, another rule directs log entries to the handler that outputs each access to *.cnn.com as an info log entry. To understand the Istio logentries, rules, and handlers, see Istio Adapter Model. A diagram with the involved entities and dependencies between them appears below:

Instances, rules and handlers for egress monitoring
Instances, rules and handlers for egress monitoring

  1. Create the logentry, rules and handlers. Note that you specify context.reporter.uid as kubernetes://istio-egressgateway in the rules to get logs from the egress gateway only.

    $ cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -f -
# Log entry for egress access
apiVersion: "config.istio.io/v1alpha2"
kind: logentry
metadata:
  name: egress-access
  namespace: istio-system
spec:
  severity: '"info"'
  timestamp: request.time
  variables:
    destination: request.host | "unknown"
    path: request.path | "unknown"
    responseCode: response.code | 0
    responseSize: response.size | 0
    reporterUID: context.reporter.uid | "unknown"
    sourcePrincipal: source.principal | "unknown"
  monitored_resource_type: '"UNSPECIFIED"'
---
# Handler for error egress access entries
apiVersion: "config.istio.io/v1alpha2"
kind: stdio
metadata:
  name: egress-error-logger
  namespace: istio-system
spec:
 severity_levels:
   info: 2 # output log level as error
 outputAsJson: true
---
# Rule to handle access to *.cnn.com/politics
apiVersion: "config.istio.io/v1alpha2"
kind: rule
metadata:
  name: handle-politics
  namespace: istio-system
spec:
  match: request.host.endsWith("cnn.com") && request.path.startsWith("/politics") && context.reporter.uid.startsWith("kubernetes://istio-egressgateway")
  actions:
  - handler: egress-error-logger.stdio
    instances:
    - egress-access.logentry
---
# Handler for info egress access entries
apiVersion: "config.istio.io/v1alpha2"
kind: stdio
metadata:
  name: egress-access-logger
  namespace: istio-system
spec:
  severity_levels:
    info: 0 # output log level as info
  outputAsJson: true
---
# Rule to handle access to *.cnn.com
apiVersion: "config.istio.io/v1alpha2"
kind: rule
metadata:
  name: handle-cnn-access
  namespace: istio-system
spec:
  match: request.host.endsWith(".cnn.com") && context.reporter.uid.startsWith("kubernetes://istio-egressgateway")
  actions:
  - handler: egress-access-logger.stdio
    instances:
      - egress-access.logentry
EOF

  2. Send three HTTP requests to cnn.com, to edition.cnn.com/politics, edition.cnn.com/sport and edition.cnn.com/health. All three should return 200 OK.

    $ kubectl exec -it $SOURCE_POD -c sleep -- sh -c 'curl -sL -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" http://edition.cnn.com/politics; curl -sL -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" http://edition.cnn.com/sport; curl -sL -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" http://edition.cnn.com/health'
200
200
200

  3. Query the Mixer log and see that the information about the requests appears in the log:

    $ kubectl -n istio-system logs -l istio-mixer-type=telemetry -c mixer | grep egress-access | grep cnn | tail -4
{"level":"info","time":"2019-01-29T07:43:24.611462Z","instance":"egress-access.logentry.istio-system","destination":"edition.cnn.com","path":"/politics","reporterUID":"kubernetes://istio-egressgateway-747b6764b8-44rrh.istio-system","responseCode":200,"responseSize":1883355,"sourcePrincipal":"cluster.local/ns/default/sa/sleep"}
{"level":"info","time":"2019-01-29T07:43:24.886316Z","instance":"egress-access.logentry.istio-system","destination":"edition.cnn.com","path":"/sport","reporterUID":"kubernetes://istio-egressgateway-747b6764b8-44rrh.istio-system","responseCode":200,"responseSize":2094561,"sourcePrincipal":"cluster.local/ns/default/sa/sleep"}
{"level":"info","time":"2019-01-29T07:43:25.369663Z","instance":"egress-access.logentry.istio-system","destination":"edition.cnn.com","path":"/health","reporterUID":"kubernetes://istio-egressgateway-747b6764b8-44rrh.istio-system","responseCode":200,"responseSize":2157009,"sourcePrincipal":"cluster.local/ns/default/sa/sleep"}
{"level":"error","time":"2019-01-29T07:43:24.611462Z","instance":"egress-access.logentry.istio-system","destination":"edition.cnn.com","path":"/politics","reporterUID":"kubernetes://istio-egressgateway-747b6764b8-44rrh.istio-system","responseCode":200,"responseSize":1883355,"sourcePrincipal":"cluster.local/ns/default/sa/sleep"}

    You see four log entries related to your three requests. Three info entries about the access to edition.cnn.com and one error entry about the access to edition.cnn.com/politics. The service mesh operators can see all the access instances, and can also search the log for error log entries that represent forbidden accesses. This is the first security measure the organization can apply before blocking the forbidden accesses automatically, namely logging all the forbidden access instances as errors. In some settings this can be a sufficient security measure.

    Note the attributes:

    • destination, path, responseCode, responseSize are related to HTTP parameters of the requests
    • sourcePrincipal:cluster.local/ns/default/sa/sleep - a string that represents the sleep service account in the default namespace
    • reporterUID: kubernetes://istio-egressgateway-747b6764b8-44rrh.istio-system - a UID of the reporting pod, in this case istio-egressgateway-747b6764b8-44rrh in the istio-system namespace

Access control by routing

After enabling logging of access to edition.cnn.com, automatically enforce an access policy, namely allow accessing /health and /sport URL paths only. Such a simple policy control can be implemented with Istio routing.

  1. Redefine your VirtualService for edition.cnn.com:

    $ cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -f -
apiVersion: networking.istio.io/v1alpha3
kind: VirtualService
metadata:
  name: direct-cnn-through-egress-gateway
spec:
  hosts:
  - edition.cnn.com
  gateways:
  - istio-egressgateway
  - mesh
  http:
  - match:
    - gateways:
      - mesh
      port: 80
    route:
    - destination:
        host: istio-egressgateway.istio-system.svc.cluster.local
        subset: cnn
        port:
          number: 443
      weight: 100
  - match:
    - gateways:
      - istio-egressgateway
      port: 443
      uri:
        regex: "/health|/sport"
    route:
    - destination:
        host: edition.cnn.com
        port:
          number: 443
      weight: 100
EOF

    Note that you added a match by uri condition that checks that the URL path is either /health or /sport. Also note that this condition is added to the istio-egressgateway section of the VirtualService, since the egress gateway is a hardened component in terms of security (see egress gateway security considerations). You don’t want any tampering with your policies.

  2. Send the previous three HTTP requests to cnn.com:

    $ kubectl exec -it $SOURCE_POD -c sleep -- sh -c 'curl -sL -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" http://edition.cnn.com/politics; curl -sL -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" http://edition.cnn.com/sport; curl -sL -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" http://edition.cnn.com/health'
404
200
200

    The request to edition.cnn.com/politics returned 404 Not Found, while requests to edition.cnn.com/sport and edition.cnn.com/health returned 200 OK, as expected.

  3. Query the Mixer log and see that the information about the requests appears again in the log:

    $ kubectl -n istio-system logs -l istio-mixer-type=telemetry -c mixer | grep egress-access | grep cnn | tail -4
{"level":"info","time":"2019-01-29T07:55:59.686082Z","instance":"egress-access.logentry.istio-system","destination":"edition.cnn.com","path":"/politics","reporterUID":"kubernetes://istio-egressgateway-747b6764b8-44rrh.istio-system","responseCode":404,"responseSize":0,"sourcePrincipal":"cluster.local/ns/default/sa/sleep"}
{"level":"info","time":"2019-01-29T07:55:59.697565Z","instance":"egress-access.logentry.istio-system","destination":"edition.cnn.com","path":"/sport","reporterUID":"kubernetes://istio-egressgateway-747b6764b8-44rrh.istio-system","responseCode":200,"responseSize":2094561,"sourcePrincipal":"cluster.local/ns/default/sa/sleep"}
{"level":"info","time":"2019-01-29T07:56:00.264498Z","instance":"egress-access.logentry.istio-system","destination":"edition.cnn.com","path":"/health","reporterUID":"kubernetes://istio-egressgateway-747b6764b8-44rrh.istio-system","responseCode":200,"responseSize":2157009,"sourcePrincipal":"cluster.local/ns/default/sa/sleep"}
{"level":"error","time":"2019-01-29T07:55:59.686082Z","instance":"egress-access.logentry.istio-system","destination":"edition.cnn.com","path":"/politics","reporterUID":"kubernetes://istio-egressgateway-747b6764b8-44rrh.istio-system","responseCode":404,"responseSize":0,"sourcePrincipal":"cluster.local/ns/default/sa/sleep"}

    You still get info and error messages regarding accesses to edition.cnn.com/politics, however this time the responseCode is 404, as expected.

While implementing access control using Istio routing worked for us in this simple case, it would not suffice for more complex cases. For example, the organization may want to allow access to edition.cnn.com/politics under certain conditions, so more complex policy logic than just filtering by URL paths will be required. You may want to apply Istio Mixer Adapters, for example white lists or black lists of allowed/forbidden URL paths, respectively. Policy Rules allow specifying complex conditions, specified in a rich expression language, which includes AND and OR logical operators. The rules can be reused for both logging and policy checks. More advanced users may want to apply Istio Role-Based Access Control.

An additional aspect is integration with remote access policy systems. If the organization in our use case operates some Identity and Access Management system, you may want to configure Istio to use access policy information from such a system. You implement this integration by applying Istio Mixer Adapters.

Cancel the access control by routing you used in this section and implement access control by Mixer policy checks in the next section.

  1. Replace the VirtualService for edition.cnn.com with your previous version from the Configure an Egress Gateway example:

    $ cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -f -
apiVersion: networking.istio.io/v1alpha3
kind: VirtualService
metadata:
  name: direct-cnn-through-egress-gateway
spec:
  hosts:
  - edition.cnn.com
  gateways:
  - istio-egressgateway
  - mesh
  http:
  - match:
    - gateways:
      - mesh
      port: 80
    route:
    - destination:
        host: istio-egressgateway.istio-system.svc.cluster.local
        subset: cnn
        port:
          number: 443
      weight: 100
  - match:
    - gateways:
      - istio-egressgateway
      port: 443
    route:
    - destination:
        host: edition.cnn.com
        port:
          number: 443
      weight: 100
EOF

  2. Send the previous three HTTP requests to cnn.com, this time you should get three 200 OK responses as previously:

    $ kubectl exec -it $SOURCE_POD -c sleep -- sh -c 'curl -sL -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" http://edition.cnn.com/politics; curl -sL -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" http://edition.cnn.com/sport; curl -sL -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" http://edition.cnn.com/health'
200
200
200

Access control by Mixer policy checks

In this step you use a Mixer Listchecker adapter, its whitelist variety. You define a listentry with the URL path of the request and a listchecker to check the listentry using a static list of allowed URL paths, specified by the overrides field. For an external Identity and Access Management system, use the providerurl field instead. The updated diagram of the instances, rules and handlers appears below. Note that you reuse the same policy rule, handle-cnn-access both for logging and for access policy checks.

Instances, rules and handlers for egress monitoring and access policies
Instances, rules and handlers for egress monitoring and access policies

  1. Define path-checker and request-path:

    $ cat <<EOF | kubectl create -f -
apiVersion: "config.istio.io/v1alpha2"
kind: listchecker
metadata:
  name: path-checker
  namespace: istio-system
spec:
  overrides: ["/health", "/sport"]  # overrides provide a static list
  blacklist: false
---
apiVersion: "config.istio.io/v1alpha2"
kind: listentry
metadata:
  name: request-path
  namespace: istio-system
spec:
  value: request.path
EOF

  2. Modify the handle-cnn-access policy rule to send request-path instances to the path-checker:

    $ cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -f -
# Rule handle egress access to cnn.com
apiVersion: "config.istio.io/v1alpha2"
kind: rule
metadata:
  name: handle-cnn-access
  namespace: istio-system
spec:
  match: request.host.endsWith(".cnn.com") && context.reporter.uid.startsWith("kubernetes://istio-egressgateway")
  actions:
  - handler: egress-access-logger.stdio
    instances:
      - egress-access.logentry
  - handler: path-checker.listchecker
    instances:
      - request-path.listentry
EOF

  3. Perform your usual test by sending HTTP requests to edition.cnn.com/politics, edition.cnn.com/sport and edition.cnn.com/health. As expected, the request to edition.cnn.com/politics returns 403 (Forbidden).

    $ kubectl exec -it $SOURCE_POD -c sleep -- sh -c 'curl -sL -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" http://edition.cnn.com/politics; curl -sL -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" http://edition.cnn.com/sport; curl -sL -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" http://edition.cnn.com/health'
403
200
200

Access control by Mixer policy checks, part 2

After the organization in our use case managed to configure logging and access control, it decided to extend its access policy by allowing the applications with a special Service Account to access any topic of cnn.com, without being monitored. You’ll see how this requirement can be configured in Istio.

  1. Start the sleep sample with the politics service account.

    $  sed 's/: sleep/: politics/g' samples/sleep/sleep.yaml | kubectl create -f -
serviceaccount "politics" created
service "politics" created
deployment "politics" created

  2. Define the SOURCE_POD_POLITICS shell variable to hold the name of the source pod with the politics service account, for sending requests to external services.

    $ export SOURCE_POD_POLITICS=$(kubectl get pod -l app=politics -o jsonpath={.items..metadata.name})

  3. Perform your usual test of sending three HTTP requests this time from SOURCE_POD_POLITICS. The request to edition.cnn.com/politics returns 403, since you did not configure the exception for the politics namespace.

    $ kubectl exec -it $SOURCE_POD_POLITICS -c politics -- sh -c 'curl -sL -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" http://edition.cnn.com/politics; curl -sL -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" http://edition.cnn.com/sport; curl -sL -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" http://edition.cnn.com/health'
403
200
200

  4. Query the Mixer log and see that the information about the requests from the politics namespace appears in the log:

    $ kubectl -n istio-system logs -l istio-mixer-type=telemetry -c mixer | grep egress-access | grep cnn | tail -4
{"level":"info","time":"2019-01-29T08:04:42.559812Z","instance":"egress-access.logentry.istio-system","destination":"edition.cnn.com","path":"/politics","reporterUID":"kubernetes://istio-egressgateway-747b6764b8-44rrh.istio-system","responseCode":403,"responseSize":84,"sourcePrincipal":"cluster.local/ns/default/sa/politics"}
{"level":"info","time":"2019-01-29T08:04:42.568424Z","instance":"egress-access.logentry.istio-system","destination":"edition.cnn.com","path":"/sport","reporterUID":"kubernetes://istio-egressgateway-747b6764b8-44rrh.istio-system","responseCode":200,"responseSize":2094561,"sourcePrincipal":"cluster.local/ns/default/sa/politics"}
{"level":"error","time":"2019-01-29T08:04:42.559812Z","instance":"egress-access.logentry.istio-system","destination":"edition.cnn.com","path":"/politics","reporterUID":"kubernetes://istio-egressgateway-747b6764b8-44rrh.istio-system","responseCode":403,"responseSize":84,"sourcePrincipal":"cluster.local/ns/default/sa/politics"}
{"level":"info","time":"2019-01-29T08:04:42.615641Z","instance":"egress-access.logentry.istio-system","destination":"edition.cnn.com","path":"/health","reporterUID":"kubernetes://istio-egressgateway-747b6764b8-44rrh.istio-system","responseCode":200,"responseSize":2157009,"sourcePrincipal":"cluster.local/ns/default/sa/politics"}

    Note that sourcePrincipal is cluster.local/ns/default/sa/politics which represents the politics service account in the default namespace.

  5. Redefine handle-cnn-access and handle-politics policy rules, to make the applications in the politics namespace exempt from monitoring and policy enforcement.

    $ cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -f -
# Rule to handle access to *.cnn.com/politics
apiVersion: "config.istio.io/v1alpha2"
kind: rule
metadata:
  name: handle-politics
  namespace: istio-system
spec:
  match: request.host.endsWith("cnn.com") && context.reporter.uid.startsWith("kubernetes://istio-egressgateway") && request.path.startsWith("/politics") && source.principal != "cluster.local/ns/default/sa/politics"
  actions:
  - handler: egress-error-logger.stdio
    instances:
    - egress-access.logentry
---
# Rule handle egress access to cnn.com
apiVersion: "config.istio.io/v1alpha2"
kind: rule
metadata:
  name: handle-cnn-access
  namespace: istio-system
spec:
  match: request.host.endsWith(".cnn.com") && context.reporter.uid.startsWith("kubernetes://istio-egressgateway") && source.principal != "cluster.local/ns/default/sa/politics"
  actions:
  - handler: egress-access-logger.stdio
    instances:
      - egress-access.logentry
  - handler: path-checker.listchecker
    instances:
      - request-path.listentry
EOF

  6. Perform your usual test from SOURCE_POD:

    $ kubectl exec -it $SOURCE_POD -c sleep -- sh -c 'curl -sL -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" http://edition.cnn.com/politics; curl -sL -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" http://edition.cnn.com/sport; curl -sL -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" http://edition.cnn.com/health'
403
200
200

    Since SOURCE_POD does not have politics service account, access to edition.cnn.com/politics is forbidden, as previously.

  7. Perform the previous test from SOURCE_POD_POLITICS:

    $ kubectl exec -it $SOURCE_POD_POLITICS -c politics -- sh -c 'curl -sL -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" http://edition.cnn.com/politics; curl -sL -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" http://edition.cnn.com/sport; curl -sL -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" http://edition.cnn.com/health'
200
200
200

    Access to all the topics of edition.cnn.com is allowed.

  8. Examine the Mixer log and see that no more requests with sourcePrincipal equal cluster.local/ns/default/sa/politics appear in the log.

    $  kubectl -n istio-system logs -l istio-mixer-type=telemetry -c mixer | grep egress-access | grep cnn | tail -4

Comparison with HTTPS egress traffic control

In this use case the applications use HTTP and Istio Egress Gateway performs TLS origination for them. Alternatively, the applications could originate TLS themselves by issuing HTTPS requests to edition.cnn.com. In this section we describe both approaches and their pros and cons.

In the HTTP approach, the requests are sent unencrypted on the local host, intercepted by the Istio sidecar proxy and forwarded to the egress gateway. Since you configure Istio to use mutual TLS between the sidecar proxy and the egress gateway, the traffic leaves the pod encrypted. The egress gateway decrypts the traffic, inspects the URL path, the HTTP method and headers, reports telemetry and performs policy checks. If the request is not blocked by some policy check, the egress gateway performs TLS origination to the external destination (cnn.com in our case), so the request is encrypted again and sent encrypted to the external destination. The diagram below demonstrates the network flow of this approach. The HTTP protocol inside the gateway designates the protocol as seen by the gateway after decryption.

HTTP egress traffic through an egress gateway
HTTP egress traffic through an egress gateway

The drawback of this approach is that the requests are sent unencrypted inside the pod, which may be against security policies in some organizations. Also some SDKs have external service URLs hard-coded, including the protocol, so sending HTTP requests could be impossible. The advantage of this approach is the ability to inspect HTTP methods, headers and URL paths, and to apply policies based on them.

In the HTTPS approach, the requests are encrypted end-to-end, from the application to the external destination. The diagram below demonstrates the network flow of this approach. The HTTPS protocol inside the gateway designates the protocol as seen by the gateway.

HTTPS egress traffic through an egress gateway
HTTPS egress traffic through an egress gateway

The end-to-end HTTPS is considered a better approach from the security point of view. However, since the traffic is encrypted the Istio proxies and the egress gateway can only see the source and destination IPs and the SNI of the destination. Since you configure Istio to use mutual TLS between the sidecar proxy and the egress gateway, the identity of the source is also known. The gateway is unable to inspect the URL path, the HTTP method and the headers of the requests, so no monitoring and policies based on the HTTP information can be possible. In our use case, the organization would be able to allow access to edition.cnn.com and to specify which applications are allowed to access edition.cnn.com. However, it will not be possible to allow or block access to specific URL paths of edition.cnn.com. Neither blocking access to edition.cnn.com/politics nor monitoring such access are possible with the HTTPS approach.

We guess that each organization will consider the pros and cons of the two approaches and choose the one most appropriate to its needs.

Summary

In this blog post we showed how different monitoring and policy mechanisms of Istio can be applied to HTTP egress traffic. Monitoring can be implemented by configuring a logging adapter. Access policies can be implemented by configuring VirtualServices or by configuring various policy check adapters. We demonstrated a simple policy that allowed certain URL paths only. We also showed a more complex policy that extended the simple policy by making an exemption to the applications with a certain service account. Finally, we compared HTTP-with-TLS-origination egress traffic with HTTPS egress traffic, in terms of control possibilities by Istio.

Cleanup

  1. Perform the instructions in Cleanup section of the Configure an Egress Gateway example.

  2. Delete the logging and policy checks configuration:

    $ kubectl delete logentry egress-access -n istio-system
$ kubectl delete stdio egress-error-logger -n istio-system
$ kubectl delete stdio egress-access-logger -n istio-system
$ kubectl delete rule handle-politics -n istio-system
$ kubectl delete rule handle-cnn-access -n istio-system
$ kubectl delete -n istio-system listchecker path-checker
$ kubectl delete -n istio-system listentry request-path

  3. Delete the politics source pod:

    $ sed 's/: sleep/: politics/g' samples/sleep/sleep.yaml | kubectl delete -f -
serviceaccount "politics" deleted
service "politics" deleted
deployment "politics" deleted